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Abstract 
Evidence on the asymmetric timeliness in the reporting of good and bad 
news follows the argument that accountants tend to use discretionary accru-
als to over-recognise bad news in order to be conservative. The Greek re-
porting framework, before the adoption of International Accounting Stan-
dards, did not allow or offer opportunities for discretionary use of accruals 
for either recording good and/or bad news. Empirical evidence based on 
data from firms that trade in the Athens Stock Exchange, for the period 1993-
2002, show that differences in the timeliness in the recognition of good news 
and bad news exist. However, in contrast to studies that use UK data and US 
data bad news are not recorded conservatively. 
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1. Introduction 
This study explores the asymmetric timeliness in the reporting of good 
and bad news in financial statements of firms that trade in the Athens Stock 
Exchange (thereafter, ASE). Conservatism in financial statements is an in-
herent attribute of the financial reporting system attributed, mainly, to the 
necessity of verifying accounting-related events. Therefore, future prospects 
of firms, although taken into account by capital markets participants in set-
ting (market efficient) stock prices, it takes long to being recognised by the 
accounting system. In itself, this long process of recognition and reporting 
drives persistence in accounting profits figures. Asymmetric timeliness in the 
recognition of good and bad news follows the tendency of professional ac-
countants to use discretionary accruals in order to be more conservative in 
the reporting of bad news or to use big bath accounting. 
The lack of discretion in the reporting framework of firms that trade in 
ASE motivates our empirical study of exploring the asymmetric timeliness in 
the reporting of good and bad news in Greece. The financial reporting system 
in Greece limits the extent of discretion that can be employed by accountants 
in reporting a number of accrual components of earnings. Firstly, deprecia-
tion expenses follow depreciation rates set by the government. Secondly, 
government sets the maximum limit in the tax-deductible allowance for bad 
debts provisions and provisions for employees. Thirdly, accounting for de-
ferred taxation has not been introduced in the Greek Accounting Plan and, 
therefore, it is rather discouraging for accountants to report accruals that ex-
ceed tax-deductible limits.  
Our study, also, attempts to verify empirical evidence based on data from 
other countries by setting a playing field in which discretion in the reporting 
of good and bad news can hardly go in either way. Basu (1997), assuming 
the conservatism tendency of accountants, provides strong evidence in favor 
of the argument that bad news are more timely reported in financial state-
ments of US firms than good news. In consequence, the time series proper-
ties of earnings of firms with good news present higher persistence and pre-
dictability than earnings numbers of firms with bad news. That is because, if 
the unexpected shock in stock prices is fully reflected in financial statement, 
it will not persist. Pope and Walker (1999) adapted the price earnings capi-
talisation model in order to capture the property of the asymmetric timeliness 
in the recognition of good and bad news. They provide evidence in favor of 
differences in the asymmetric timeliness property between UK GAAP and 
US GAAP driven by differences in reporting requirements in the classifica-
tion of extraordinary and exceptional items. 
Ball et al (2000) compares the asymmetric timeliness in the recognition 
of good and bad news between common law countries (i.e. US and UK) and 
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code law countries (i.e. Germany, France). They argue that incentives to-
wards timely recognition of bad news are lower in code law than common 
law countries. That is because, firstly, there is lower demand for timely in-
formation in code law countries as managers’ actions are tractable by big 
stockholding institutions and, secondly, because timely recognition of news 
(especially for bad news) might cause income volatility that it is dis-
incentivised in code law countries. They present empirical results consistent 
with their argument. In contrast Giner and Rees (2001) presented evidence 
against the existence of major differences in the asymmetric timeliness of the 
reporting of good and bad news between UK, France and Germany. 
To the range between common law and code law countries Greece is 
closer to code law countries. The reporting framework of Greek companies 
with an explicit focus on taxable income suggests that evidence on the 
asymmetric timeliness should be closer to those reported for other European 
code law countries. However, empirical results for Germany and France are 
not unanimous across studies. Moreover, these studies focus on differences 
across countries and do not explain implied biases. Furthermore, disparate 
concerns related to shareholders protection have been appeared from the au-
thority of the ASE after the stock price bubble of 1999. Finally, corporate 
governance mechanisms have been only recently been changed and, there-
fore, Ball et al’ (2000) arguments might not be descriptive for the period ex-
amined.      
A number of interesting results are reported in our study. Firstly, we de-
tect that bad news are more timely reflected in financial statements than good 
news. Secondly, contemporaneous reported earnings for firms with good 
news are close to be totally unrelated to changes in stock prices. Thirdly, we 
detect that bad news tends to be reported in a closely unbiased and perfectly 
timely way. Overall, our interpretation to these results is that in a reporting 
environment in which discretion in the reporting of accrual components is 
rather limited, good news are hardly captured by accounting profits numbers 
while earnings shocks driven by bad news are fully capitalised by the stock 
market. This interpretation drives a number of potential interesting implica-
tions. It suggests that all other factors equal, discretion allowed in other re-
porting regimes tends to assist in the more timely reporting of good news 
rather than deteriorating their timeliness. Secondly, it justifies efforts of audi-
tors towards an increasing number of notes in their qualifications, as it is 
rather common for firms that trade in ASE. Thirdly, it suggests that accep-
tance of International Accounting Standards might be of more help if they 
allow discretion in the reporting of good news. Fourthly, our results, that 
show that annual financial statements capture bad news, imply that concerns 
over shareholder’s protection should be directed to other potential sources of 
information (i.e. firm’s announcements and speculation).       
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The remaining of our study is organised as follows; in section 2, we re-
view the literature related to the timeliness property of earnings. In section 3 
we develop the research design. In section 4, we present descriptive statistics, 
in section 5 we analyse our empirical results, while in section 6 we present 
some sensitivity analysis. Finally, we conclude in section 7. 
2. Literature Review 
Timeliness is the property of accounting numbers that is related to 
whether accounting information is available to the user of financial state-
ments before it loses its ability to influence his decision output. Lack of time-
liness is due to reporting lag and to recognition lag. Reporting lag is related 
to the time gap between fiscal year (or quarter) end and the release of audited 
financial reports. Recognition lag is driven by the necessity to verify an event 
before it is recorded in financial reports. 
Givoly and Palmon (1982) and Chambers and Penman (1984) provide 
evidence of a differential market reaction to earnings announcements driven 
by differences in the timing of the announcement. Early announcement re-
leases are related to more intense market reactions than late announcements 
suggesting that users of financial statements have potentially used other 
sources of information. Research on the effect of recognition lag on the in-
formativeness of accounting numbers has been quite extensive. Warfield and 
Wild (1992), Lev (1989), Easton et al (1992), Collins et al (1994), Kothari 
and Sloan (1992), Donnelly and Walker (1995) provide evidence in favor of 
the existence of a recognition lag and of the association between current pe-
riod earnings and lagged period returns
1
.  
Basu (1997), firstly, provided evidence on differences in the timeliness 
of reporting good and bad news. Assuming the tendency of professional ac-
countants to be more conservative in the reporting of bad news, Basu (1997) 
provides strong evidence in favor of the more timely reporting of bad news. 
Using reverse regressions, he founds that raw (adjusted) returns are more 
highly associated to current earnings for firm-year observations with nega-
tive returns than for firm-year observations with positive returns. He, also, 
showed that the coefficient attached to current period returns for firm-year 
observations with negative returns is higher than the coefficient attached to 
returns for firm-year observations with positive returns. 
Pope and Walker (1999) presented a model, based on earnings capitalisa-
tion model, in order to capture differences in the timing of the reporting of 
good and bad news. They provide evidence in favor of differences in the 
                                                        
1
 See also Beaver, Lambert and Morse (1980), Collins et al (1987) and Beaver, Lambert and 
Ryan (1987). 
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asymmetric timeliness of good and bad news between US GAAP and UK 
GAAP. Based on their model, they show that both US GAAP accounting and 
UK GAAP accounting are far from being timely and unbiased for both good 
and bad news. They found that both good and bad news are conservatively 
reported. That has interesting implications for the lead-lag relation between 
current period earnings and lag period returns. They found that the effect of 
prior period bad (good) news has a decreasing (increasing) effect on current 
period earnings as captured by the coefficient attached to prior period re-
turns. Moreover, Pope and Walker (2001) show empirical results that are 
consistent with the argument that conservatism in the reporting of current 
period bad news is inversely related to the market to book ratio. That follows 
the reasoning that if prior period assets have been conservatively recorded in 
financial statements then accountants cannot, conservatively, record current 
period bad news. 
Ball et al (2000) provide evidence in favor of the argument that the 
asymmetric timeliness in the reporting of good and bad news is much lower 
in code law countries than common law countries. Moreover, using data for 
the period 1985-1995, they found that contemporaneous income before ex-
traordinary items (in Germany and in France) reflects bad news in a more 
timely way than good news. However, differences in the asymmetry of rec-
ognition of good and bad news are lower than other common law countries. 
In contrast, Giner and Rees (2001) focused on bottom line earnings for the 
period 1990 – 1998 and presented evidence in favor of the existence of simi-
larities in the asymmetric timeliness of the reporting of good and bad news 
between UK, France and Germany. 
3. Research Design 
Our research design is based on Pope and Walker (1999) modeling. Per-
manent earnings (x) are defined by the following identity: 
c
x
P
t
t
=              (1) 
where Pt denotes stock price at time t and c denotes the cost of capital. 
Assuming that dividends are equal to permanent earnings, the random shock 
(e) to permanent earnings is related to price as follows: 
( )
1tt1ttt
PP*cxxe
−−
−=−=          (2) 
where c is assumed to be constant. Reported earnings (Xt) are related to 
permanent earnings after allowing for a differential degree of incorporating 
positive shocks (e
+
) and negative shocks (e
-
) as follows 
ttttt
VeexX ++−=
−+ γθ          (3) 
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where θ and γ capture, respectively, the under-recognition and over-
recognition of permanent earnings shocks in good and bad news’ periods. Vt 
is related to previous period shocks that are currently captured by reported 
earnings. Deflated by Pt-1, model (3) is altered as follows: 
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where R is current period return. A perfectly timely and unbiased ac-
counting suggests that θ and γ are equal to zero. Asymmetric timeliness in 
the reporting of good and bad news suggests that the coefficient attached to 
current period return when it is positive is lower than the coefficient attached 
to current period return when it is negative. We are empirically testing this 
by the following regression: 
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where D is a dummy variable taking the value of one if current period re-
turn is negative, otherwise it is equal to zero and εt is the error term (firm 
subscripts are omitted). Following model (3b), ( )θ−= 1cb
0
and 
( )γθ += cb
1
. If b1 is greater than zero, it implies that the responsiveness 
of current period earnings to bad news is greater than the responsiveness to 
good news and suggests conservative accounting. 
In order to accommodate the effect of last period news’ shocks on cur-
rent period earnings model (3) is altered as follows; 
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where Vt/t-2 captures shocks arising before last year. We are empirically 
testing model (3c) after deflating all terms by Pt-2. Model (Reg1) is altered to  
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where, R
’
 (in Reg2) differs from R (in Reg1) due to the fact that et is de-
flated by Pt-2 and not by Pt-1. 
In this study we are using empirical specifications based on model 
(Reg1) and model (Reg2) in order to provide evidence on the asymmetric 
timeliness in the reporting of good and bad news. Given the lack of discre-
tion that professional accountants in Greek firms face, we expect that it is 
less likely that we found evidence in favor of γ (that is related to the over-
recognition of current period negative returns) being higher than zero. We 
also compare model (Reg1) to a more constraint model (Reg) that does not 
allow for differences in the timely recognition of good and bad news.  
Moreover, we expect that we found no evidence of asymmetric timeli-
ness in the reporting of good and bad news due to accounting related prac-
tices. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that speculation has given rise 
to positive changes in stock prices (such as in 1998). That means that we 
might detect asymmetric timeliness either in favor of good and/or bad news 
if prices are not market efficient. Furthermore, we do not know how bad or 
good news would have been recorded in an environment with no discretion. 
That is if good news are related to a long horizon or bad news are related to a 
short horizon, then we would probably detect asymmetric timeliness regard-
less of the fact that discretion is not allowed. 
4. Descriptive Statistics 
The initial sample of 1104 firm-year observations covers the period 
1992-2001 and excludes banks, insurance and investment firms. The initial 
sample is firstly reduced to 854 firm-year observations after requiring that 
information for relevant variables is available for one lagged period. This 
sample is further reduced to 760 firm-year observations (covering the period 
1993-2001) after deleting the top and bottom percentile (identified yearly) of 
the following variables: 
IB: Current period earnings before extraordinary items minus tax 
charges
2
 (deflated by opening market value of common equity), 
IB’: Current period earnings before extraordinary items minus tax 
charges (deflated by prior period opening market value of common equity), 
R: Current period change in market value of common equity deflated by 
opening market value of common equity, 
                                                        
2
 Tax charges include income tax and taxes that are not allowed to be deducted in order to 
compute taxable income. We have not adjusted tax charges for the exclusion of extraordinary 
items. In contrast to UK and US GAAP, in the Greek accounting plan extraordinary items are 
not reported net of taxes.   
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R’: Current period change in market value of common equity deflated by 
prior period opening market value of common equity, 
LR’: Prior period change in market value of common equity deflated by 
the period’s opening market value of common equity. 
All capital market variables are adjusted for equity related corporate ac-
tions. We, also, allow for a three-month window when using market data in 
order to disseminate the effect of the reporting lag of information in financial 
statements. 
In Panel A of Table 1, we present descriptive statistics. The mean of IB 
and of IB’ is positive (0.043 and 0.056, respectively) and as in typical UK 
data and US data losses are reported in around 10 % of the sample (74 out of 
760 firm-year observations). Average return (R and R’) is positive (0.449 and 
0.709) while median return is negative (- 0.035 and – 0.032) suggesting the 
existence of positive skweness in stock price changes
3
. In contrast to data 
from other studies, negative returns are reported in 52 % (37 % of the sample 
in UK data and in US data, 49 % for German data and 43 % for French data
4
) 
of the sample. Moreover, in our sample the percentage of firm-year observa-
tions with negative returns across years is not stable, varying from the low 
extreme 0% in 1999 to the highest extreme of 100 % in 2000 (statistics not 
tabulated). Median market to book ratio is greater than 1 suggesting the exis-
tence of conservatism in the reporting of the book value of equity. 
We should note a methodological issue that is related to the descriptive 
statistics of our study. Apart from pooled regressions, Pope and Walker 
(1999), also, used annual regressions and presented statistics based on aver-
age values of coefficients
5
. In our study two problems arise. Firstly, the sam-
ple size for each year is small (from low 38 in 1993 to high 135 for 2001). 
This might affect the assumption of the normal distribution. Secondly, and 
potentially more important, following the small sample size and the fact that 
the percentage of firm-year observations with negative returns across years is 
not stable dummy variables might create independent sub-samples with very 
small sizes. Small sample size might affect our inferences and that is why we 
prefer pooled specifications. However, we repeat our regression tests allow-
ing for annual dummy variables for the constant and annual regression tests 
for sub-samples with no less than twenty observations. 
                                                        
3
 We have repeated our regression tests using a sub-sample of firm-year observation with R and 
LR’ lower than 4. Our main empirical findings are not altered. These results are available by 
authors upon request.  
4
 Descriptions of UK data and US data are drawn by Pope and Walker’ (1999) study, while 
descriptions of France and German data are taken by Giner and Rees (2001). 
5
 The use of annual regressions reduces the effect of parameter’s estimates’ dependence across 
years that might exist in pooled regressions. 
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In Panel B of Table 1 we present Pearson (above the diagonal) and 
Spearman (below the diagonal) correlation coefficients. IB is positively re-
lated as expected to IB’ and current period return (R and R’). The Pearson 
correlation coefficient between IB and LR’ is negative (- 0.11) and statisti-
cally different from zero. This might be due to either to extreme observations 
or to the use of the deflator, because the correlation between IB’ and LR’ is 
as expected positive. The positive relation between IB’ and LR’ (0.24 and 
0.40) is consistent with the effect of recognition lag (conservatism) in the 
reporting of economic events in financial statements of Greek firms. Finally, 
our data confirm the non-correlation between current period and prior period 
returns. 
5. Empirical Results 
In section 5.1 we present empirical results that are confined to whether 
contemporaneous bad and good news are timely recognised by the reporting 
framework without examining the effect of prior period news on current pe-
riod earnings. In section 5.2, we examine the effect of prior period news on 
contemporaneous earnings. 
5.1 The recognition of current period news without reference to prior 
period news 
In Table 2 we present our empirical results related to the asymmetric 
timeliness in the reporting of good news and bad news of firms that trade in 
the ASE. Following results from correlation coefficients in Panel B of Table 
1, the coefficient attached to R in a regression of IB on R is positive (0.009) 
and significantly different from zero
6
. In comparison to Pope and Walker’ 
(1999) study and to Giner and Rees (2001) an interesting result arise. That is 
that the coefficient attached to R is around one tenth of the respective coeffi-
cient from tests based on data from UK, US, France and Germany. Although 
data might not be comparable, our results confirm that overall current period 
earnings of firms that trade in ASE under-recognise current period news in 
contrast to results for US and UK data where an over-recognition of news is 
apparent. That is because coefficient attached to R is significantly different 
                                                        
6
 Reported p.values (in the text and in tables) are based on OLS statistics. White (1980) statis-
tics are not reported but they do not qualitatively alter our inferences. Tests of differences be-
tween coefficients that are reported in the text are not tabulated. They are based on OLS statis-
tics. White (1980) statistics for differences between coefficients do not qualitatively change 
empirical results. All relevant statistics are available by authors upon request. 
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from the regression’ constant (0.039), which, according to the model, repre-
sents the cost of capital. 
Empirical results from the inclusion of dummy variables that capture the 
effect of the asymmetric timeliness in the reporting of current period good 
and bad news are provided on the basis of model (Reg1). The inclusion of 
dummy variables for the constant and the coefficient attached to R, improve 
the explained variability of current period earnings (IB) by more than twice 
(adjusted R
2
 increases from 0,055 to 0,142). Our results also confirm that 
current period good news are not al all recognised by current period earnings 
(that is θ is equal to 1) because the coefficient attached to R (0.002) is not 
statistically different from zero. In contrast, the bad news incremental coeffi-
cient’ estimate of b1 is positive (0.070) and statistically different from zero. 
This result confirms that bad news are more timely reflected in current period 
earnings than good news. Moreover, the sum of b0 and b1 is greater and sta-
tistically different than the sum of a0 and a1 suggesting that γ is around 0.5 
and implies conservatism in the recognition of bad news. 
In Panel B of Table 2, we repeat regression models used in Panel A of 
Table 2 by including dummy variables for the constant for each year. Apart 
from methodological issues referred above, this alteration also follows the 
argument that the cost of capital might be changing across years
7
 and that the 
percentage of firm-year observations with negative returns across years is not 
stable. Inferences from empirical results based on the less constrained model 
(Reg) are not different from those reported in Panel A of Table 2. The ad-
justed R
2
 is higher (0.14) because annual dummy variables on constant might 
capture the effect of other missing variables. In relation to the less con-
strained model (Reg1), some inferences are altered. Firstly, the coefficient 
attached to R (0.005) is significantly different from zero suggesting that cur-
rent period good news are recognised in current period earnings although in a 
non-timely way. Secondly, although as in Panel A bad news are recognised 
more timely than good news, b0 (0.052) in Panel B is much lower than the 
respective coefficient in Panel A of Table 2. The sum of b0 and b1 is greater 
and statistically different than the sum of a0 and a1 only in years 2000 and 
2001, implying conservatism in the recognition of bad news only in recent 
years. The inclusion of annual dummy variables for the constant slightly in-
creases adjusted R
2
 from 0.142 to 0.169. 
We also perform annual regression tests based on model (Reg) separate 
for firm-year observations with positive and negative returns. In Panel C of 
Table 2, we present our empirical results only for cases in which sub-sample 
                                                        
7
 Data are not adjusted for inflation and, therefore, the rapid decline of inflation might affect 
the cost of capital. 
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size is equal to or greater than twenty. In one (1996) out of six (1993, 1995, 
1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999) annual sub-samples of firm-year observations 
with positive returns, the coefficient attached to R is significantly different 
from zero. In contrast, except for 1997, the coefficient attached to R is sig-
nificantly different from zero in all other years (1994, 1996, 2000 and 2001) 
for annual sub-samples of firm-year observations with negative returns. 
These results are consistent with results from previous panels related to the 
more timely recognition of current period bad news in relation to good news. 
Our results from annual regressions show that the coefficient attached to R is 
statistically different from the constant (p. value is 0.05) only in year 2001. 
This suggests that the bad news are reflected in a timely but not conservative 
manner. Our inferences are, also, in contrast to empirical results from France 
and Germany as reported by Giner and Rees (2001) who found conservatism 
in the reporting of bad news. 
5.2 The recognition of prior period news 
In Panel A of Table 3 we present empirical results from a pooled empiri-
cal specification of model (Reg2). Our empirical results confirm that prior 
period news are reflected in current period earnings because estimates of b1 
(0.019) and of f1 (0.065) are significantly different from zero. Moreover, our 
empirical results suggest that both current period good and bad news are rec-
ognised in current period earnings. In consistence with prior results, estimate 
of f0 (0.028) is significantly different from zero suggesting that bad news are 
reflected in a more timely way than good news. 
However, in contrast to inferences from previous panels current period 
bad news are not reflected in a timely way because the sum of b0 (0.004) and 
of f0 is statistically different and lower from the sum of a0 (0.069) and of a1 (- 
0.015)
8
. Similar to Pope and Walker (1999) we find that the effect of prior 
period good news on current period earnings is higher than the effect of cur-
rent period news, because f1 is statistically greater than f2. Similar differences 
are shown for the effect of prior and current period bad news. This result is in 
contrast to results from Pope and Walker (1999) but it is expected in our 
study as long as current period bad news are not conservatively reported. The 
sum of b1 and of f1 is statistically different and greater than zero suggesting 
that prior period bad news are ‘conservatively’ reported in current period 
earnings, while the same argument does not apply for prior period good 
                                                        
8
 Pope and Walker (1999) have also presented a decrease in the estimate of the coefficient at-
tached to current period bad news but this decrease has not affected their inferences on the 
conservative recognition of bad news. 
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news. This might be expected if current period earnings are capturing the 
under-recognition of prior year bad news.  
Regression results from Panel A of Table 3 are not comparable to those 
from Table 2 because variables are deflated in a different way. However, 
adjusted R
2
 form the pooled empirical specification of model (Reg2) is much 
higher (0.229) from those reported in Table 2. Empirical evidence from a 
pooled specification of model (Reg2) in which annual dummy variables for 
the constant are included in the model are presented in Panel B of Table 3. 
Inferences are qualitatively the same as those reported in Panel A of Table 3. 
In Panel C of Table 3, we present empirical results from annual regres-
sions of sub-samples with no less than 20 observations that are classified to 
four groups according to the sign of current and prior period return. For sub-
samples with both positive current and prior period return (namely 1998 and 
1999), coefficient attached to R’ (0.008 and 0.003) is not significantly differ-
ent from zero, while only in 1999 coefficient attached to LR’ (0.023) is sig-
nificantly different from zero. In contrast, for two (1996 and 2001) out of 
three (1996, 1997 and 2001) sub-samples with both negative current and 
prior period return coefficient estimates attached to R’ and LR’ are signifi-
cantly different from zero. However, neither coefficient is different from 
their respective constant (suggesting timeliness rather conservatism). Follow-
ing the argument of timely recognition, in none year estimates of R’ are dif-
ferent from estimates of LR’. 
In four years (1993, 1995, 1997 and 1998) R’ is positive and LR’ is nega-
tive. As in aforementioned results, in year 1997 coefficient estimate attached 
to R’ and LR’ is not significant. In contrast coefficient estimate attached to 
(negative) LR’ is positive and significantly different from zero in all other 
years but different from its respective constant (implying conservatism) only 
in 1993. Similar to previous results, in none year coefficient attached to R’ is 
different from zero. Three years are qualified for firm-year observations with 
negative R’ and positive LR’ (1994, 1996, 2000). In 1996 estimates attached 
to R’ and LR’ are not different from zero, in contrast to 1994 and 2000. In 
year 1994, coefficient estimate of R is higher and statistically different from 
coefficient estimate of LR’ implying a more timely recognition of current 
period bad news than previous period good news. 
Overall, results from annual regressions based on model (Reg2), con-
firming those reported in Panel C of Table 2, show that in none year current 
period good news are reflected in current period earnings, while current pe-
riod bad news are reflected in contemporaneous earnings more times. More-
over, consistent with the prior recognition of previous period good and bad 
news in contemporaneous earnings coefficient estimate attached to LR’ is 
significant in more years. However, in contrast to results from Panel A and 
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Panel B of Table 3, annual regressions fail to capture over recognition of last 
year bad news in all but one year. 
6. Sensitivity Analysis 
6.1 Use of Pt as a deflator 
Equation (3) and equation (3c) suggest that price-earnings ratio should 
deviate from the cost of capital if price shocks are not reflected in a timely 
manner. The use of Pt as a deflator has a number of interesting implications. 
Firstly, empirical specifications of model (Reg1) and model (Reg2) are com-
parable. Secondly, price-earnings ratio is a measure that has a more meaning-
ful interpretation than earnings deflated by beginning period stock price. 
Our results from the pooled specification of model (Reg1) and model 
(Reg2) are reported in Table 4. The reader should note that coefficient esti-
mates attached to ‘reformed’ current period returns reflect the multiple of γ 
times c rather than (1 - γ) times c. Inferences based on model (Reg1) are 
similar to those reported in Panel B of Table 2. Good news are not timely 
reflected as b0 (- 0.058) is negative and γ approaches zero as the sum of a0 
(0.059) and b0 is not statistically different from zero. Moreover, b1 is positive 
(0.079), significantly different from zero, and implies conservatism in the 
recognition of bad news as the sum of b0 and b1 is positive and significantly 
different from zero. 
Empirical results from the inclusion of previous periods price shocks 
suggest that current period bad shocks are reflected timely as the sum of co-
efficient estimates of b0 (- 0.063) and f0 (0.065) is not statistically different 
from zero. This result is different from those reported earlier in Panel A of 
Table 3 and those aforementioned earlier in Table 4. Moreover, similar to 
results from Table 3 previous period bad shocks are reported conservatively 
as the sum of b1 (- 0.019) and f1 (0.034) is statistically different from zero. In 
results of Table 3, this explanation was following the evidence of under rec-
ognition of contemporaneous bad news but a similar finding has not been 
shown in Table 4
9
. In accordance with previous results, prior (current) period 
good news are (not) reflected in current period earnings-price ratio. 
6.2 The effect of prior period news for more than one period 
We extend model (Reg2) in order to examine the effect of prior period 
news for a period up to three years. We use two deflators, that is Pt-4 and Pt, 
and we perform regression tests based on the following two models; 
                                                        
9
 Qualitatively similar inferences are drawn from empirical evidence after allowing for annual 
dummy variables on the constant of the regression.  
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3 3
0 1
0 04 4 4
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−
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= + + + +∑ ∑ , 
 (Reg3), 
and 
3 3
0 1
0 0
t t r t r
t r r t r t
r rt t t
X e e
a a D b f D
P P P
ε
− −
−
= =
= + + + +∑ ∑ , 
 (Reg4). 
 
We reconstruct a sub-sample based on our initial observations and after 
we identify the top 1% and bottom 1% of all variables as extreme observa-
tions we arrive at a sample of 438 firm-year observations. 
Empirical results based on model (Reg3) and model (Reg4) are shown on 
Table 5. In consistence with results from Panel A of Table 3 (Table 4), em-
pirical results based on model (Reg3) [model (Reg4)] suggest that current 
period good news are reflected in contemporaneous earnings in a non-timely 
way (are not reflected at all). Moreover, current period bad news are re-
flected more timely than good news but not in a conservative way. 
Inferences on the effect of prior period news are not similar across two 
models. Results from model (Reg3) suggest that, up to two years before, the 
speed of recognition of bad news in current period earnings is similar to that 
of good news and that both are recognised conservatively. In contrast evi-
dence from model (Reg4) show that, although prior period good news are not 
yet fully capitalised, prior period bad news are not recognised conservatively 
as the sum b1 and f1 and the sum of b2 and f2 is not statistically different from 
zero. Furthermore, results from model (Reg4) suggest that both good and bad 
news three years before are fully capitalised in contemporaneous earnings, 
while model (Reg3) confirms that this inference applies for bad news only 
(as the sum b3 and f3 is not statistically different from the sum a0 and a1). 
7. Conclusions 
In this study we attempted to provide evidence on the asymmetric timeli-
ness in the reporting of good and bad news of firms that trade in the Athens 
Stock Exchange. The reporting framework of those firms does not allow for 
discretion in the reporting of either good or bad news. Therefore, we expect 
that, firstly, differences on the timeliness of the recognition of good and bad 
news will be less apparent for firms that use the Greek reporting framework 
and, secondly, that bad news will not be reported in a conservative way. 
Overall, our results do not comply with our first expectation. The speed 
of the recognition of current period bad news is higher than the speed of rec-
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ognition of current period good news, while most empirical specifications 
suggest that the same argument apply for bad and good news affecting stock 
prices in earlier periods. However, most empirical results confirm our second 
expectation. Evidence from tests of annual regressions and from most em-
pirical specifications that allow for the effect of prior period news on con-
temporaneous earnings suggest that current period bad news are not reported 
conservatively. 
Our results on the higher speed of recognition of current period bad news 
on contemporaneous earnings does not differ from results from similar tests 
performed in other countries (UK, US, Germany and France) as reported by 
Pope and Walker (1999), Ball et al (2000) and Giner and Rees (2001). There 
are though notable differences related to the implied conservatism in the re-
porting of bad news. This difference might be driven by the fact that discre-
tion in the reporting of accruals is limited for reasons related to the estima-
tion of taxable income.   
These inferences are of interest to financial setters and capital market 
participants because the Greek reporting framework is replaced by Interna-
tional Accounting Standards. From a researcher’s point of view it is of inter-
est to examine whether International Accounting Standards will allow for a 
different degree of discretion in the reporting of accruals that will affect the 
speed of recognition of good and bad news. Our results also suggest, that as 
long as discretion can hardly go in either way, then the higher speed in the 
recognition of bad news is potentially driven by events that take place shortly 
after they affect stock prices. Moreover, concerns raised by capital market 
participants related to the protection of shareholders should be aimed to other 
sources of information as bad news are recorded by financial statements.  
This study can be extended by looking on whether our results on the 
asymmetric timeliness in the reporting of good and bad news is well shown 
in the time series properties of earnings. Moreover, concerns should be raised 
on the differential inferences drawn from the use of different deflators. Re-
sults from Giner and Rees (2001) are also suffering from the same problem. 
Finally, one might also be looking on differences on the asymmetric timeli-
ness in the reporting of good and bad news considering bottom line earnings 
where exceptional provisions and depreciation accruals appeared under the 
Greek Accounting Plan. 
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